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Abstract in English 
International negotiations on the liberalisation of service trade are concentrated at non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs). National government measures form important obstacles for service providers 
when they want to access foreign markets. International studies predict substantial welfare 
benefits from removing trade obstacles for services. Negotiations on lowering these obstacles 
are complicated because government regulations are seldom strictly oriented at keeping foreign 
firms out their domestic service markets. Some of them (e.g. quantity-based restrictions) are 
clearly at odds with WTO principles. We argue however that in most cases regulators primarily 
aimed at correcting domestic market failures with disregard for the potential repercussions for 
foreign providers of services. In negotiations this problem can be approached by introducing 
economic necessity tests, but that is a very long and tedious process. We propose a different 
negotiation approach based on lessons learned from WTO negotiations on agricultural support 
measures. 
 
Key words:  WTO negotiations, GATS, services, NTB’s, regulation 
 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Internationale onderhandelingen over handelsliberalisatie van diensten spitsen zich toe op non-
tariffaire belemmeringen (NTB’s). Nationale overheidsmaatregelen zijn vaak belangrijke 
obstakels voor dienstenaanbieders, als zij op buitenlandse markten willen penetreren. Volgens 
internationale studies zijn er aanzienlijke welvaartswinsten mogelijk als deze barrières geslecht 
worden. Een probleem is dat veel van deze overheidsmaatregelen niet het primaire doel hebben 
om buitenlandse aanbieders te weren. Vaak zijn er binnenlandse motiveringen voor deze 
maatregelen om bijvoorbeeld binnenlands marktfalen te corrigeren. Hierbij worden de 
repercussies op buitenlandse dienstenaanbieders niet meegenomen. In de onderhandelingen 
kunnen deze effecten worden meegenomen door toetsen op economische noodzakelijkheid in te 
voeren. Dat is echter een tijdrovend proces. We stellen een andere onderhandelingsstrategie 
voor, gebaseerd op de WTO onderhandelingen over landbouwsteun.  
 
Steekwoorden: WTO onderhandelingen, GATS, diensten, NTB’s, regulering 
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Summary 
Service industries typically account for 50 to 70 per cent of national product, both in developing 
countries and developed countries. However, international trade barely represents 7 per cent of 
world services production. Low levels of international service trade can be explained from 
technical matters, regulation-based trade barriers, and cultural differences like language.  
During the Uruguay Round, the liberalisation of international trade in services for the first 
time formally entered the WTO negotiations, resulting in a General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). Renewal and extension of this agreement is scheduled to be one of the results 
of the Doha Round. Many empirical simulation studies find a significant welfare improvement 
of further liberalisation of international service markets. However, signals from the GATS 
negotiation table indicate that at best a modest lowering of market access barriers in services 
can be expected. For achieving the full welfare gains from liberalised international trade in 
services we probably will have to look beyond the horizon of the Doha Round. 
The GATS negotiations are quite complex. Not only do the country proposals cover a range 
of 160 commercial service industries, but also four different modes of supplying service across 
national borders including cross-border trade, local activities by service multinationals, and  
temporary border-crossing by individual service providers. 
In this article we argue that future GATS rounds are likely to increase in complexity. The 
reason is that at some moment the 'easy' liberalisation measures - like removing domestic 
regulations that unintentionally hamper international market access - will be exhausted. An 
increasing part of the remaining non-tariff barriers in national service markets is associated with 
national policy goals unrelated to trade, like for instance consumer protection or labour market 
regulation. Removal of such non-tariff barriers then requires domestic welfare trade-offs. 
Internationally co-ordinated liberalisation will have to face such issues. Our paper proposes a 
new negotiation approach that may keep future GATS rounds efficient, and make them more 
fruitful. 
Some lessons can be learned from the way in which agricultural subsidies were brought into 
the WTO negotiation framework during the Uruguay Round. The basic idea is that countries 
review and classify the NTB character of measures that deal with market failures in their 
domestic service industries. The trade-distorting effects and the welfare aims at which the non-
tariff measures originally aimed need to be disentangled. In our proposal member states classify 
their domestic regulations for services into four virtual coloured boxes.  
The red box contains NTBs like quantitative trade restrictions or price differentiation for 
domestic and foreign providers of services. These measures are obviously at odds with the 
WTO principle of non-discrimination. The NTBs in the red box do not address domestic market 
failures and protectionist motives prevail. Such NTBs deserve priority in the negotiations. 
  Measures that do address domestic market failures, but have unintended and/or 
unnecessary trade-restricting impacts, belong in the brown box. In these cases, adaptation of the  
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measures is relatively easy and costless, if GATS creates an incentive for doing so. When 
considering positive domestic welfare effects of more foreign market access, the brown-box 
cases are potential win-win situations. 
  The blue box contains more complicated NTBs in services industries. These measures 
address real market failures at a national basis, while the market failure has broadly shared 
international dimensions. This market barrier is a side-effect of intervention for an 
internationally shared problem. GATS is not the proper negotiating forum to discuss the 
harmonisation of standards; there are better international forums for doing so. GATS 
negotiations do, however, offer the possibility for countries to lay down the commitment that 
their national standards for these services will be based on internationally agreed standards.  
  Finally, the green box includes those measures that repair domestic market failures, with 
unavoidable trade effects that a country wants to take for granted, because of strong national 
preferences in this particular policy domain. The green box in fact circumscribes the no-go area 
for GATS negotiations. 
Our proposal will make future GATS negotiations processes more efficient by going straight 
to the most urgent and promising trade issues (the red-box and brown-box). Moreover, it could 
reduce potential strategic behaviour, and it creates a self-disciplinary behaviour for the member 
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1  Introduction
1 
Service industries typically account for 50 to 70 per cent of national product, both in developing 
countries and developed countries. However, international trade barely represents 7 per cent of 
world services production.
2  Developing countries tend to have rather closed service sectors. 
Most of the international trade in services is accounted for by developed countries, but even in 
these countries, service industries contribute only modestly to foreign trade. Low levels of 
international service trade can be explained from technical matters, regulation-based trade 
barriers, and cultural differences like language (OECD, 2003).  
During the Uruguay Round, the liberalisation of international trade in services for the first 
time formally entered the WTO negotiations, resulting in a General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). Renewal and extension of this agreement is scheduled to be one of the results 
of the Doha Round. Any economist would blindly accept a bet that ―considering Ricardo's 
comparative advantages― a welfare improvement must be possible by increasing international 
trade in services. Indeed, that is what many empirical simulation studies find. However, signals 
from the GATS negotiation table indicate that at best a modest lowering of market access 
barriers in services can be expected. For achieving the full welfare gains from liberalised 
international trade in services we probably will have to look beyond the horizon of the Doha 
Round.  
In this article we argue that future GATS rounds are likely to increase in complexity. The 
reason is that at some moment the 'easy' liberalisation measures - like removing domestic 
regulations that unintentionally hamper international market access - will be exhausted. An 
increasing part of the remaining non-tariff barriers in national service markets is associated with 
national policy goals unrelated to trade, like for instance consumer protection or labour market 
regulation. Removal of such non-tariff barriers then requires domestic welfare trade-offs. 
Internationally co-ordinated liberalisation will have to face such issues. Our paper proposes a 
new negotiation approach that may keep future GATS rounds efficient, and make them more 
fruitful. 
The basic idea is that countries review and classify the NTB character of measures that deal 
with market failures in their domestic service industries. Some lessons can be learned from the 
way in which agricultural subsidies were brought into the WTO negotiation framework during 
the Uruguay Round. A similar approach can be used to strike a better balance between 
liberalised service trade and the correction of domestic market failures. The trade-distorting 
effects and the welfare aims at which the non-tariff measures originally aimed need to be 
disentangled. Therefore we propose to discriminate four virtual boxes, based on four criteria.  
 
1 We thank Theo van de Klundert for useful comments. 
2
This reduces to 5.3 per cent if we disregard intra-EU services trade. This is calculated for the year 2000 on the basis of 
World Bank GDP data and WTO data on international service trade.  
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These criteria are the trade-restrictiveness of the measure, the necessity of the trade 
restrictiveness of the barrier, the motivation of correcting domestic market failures, and the 
international dimensions of the market failure. This classification scheme could structure the 
GATS negotiations and make them more fruitful and efficient. 
This proposal is presented in section 5. Section 2 discusses the liberalisation of trade in 
services.  Section 3 presents the current status of the negotiations in the Doha round, and section 
4 discusses the relation between the trade-restrictiveness of regulation and the aim of correcting 
domestic market failures with the regulation measures. Section 6 concludes  
  11 
2  Liberalisation of international trade in services  
Only a small fraction of service products, like standard software packages, can be stored and 
shipped in boxes like traditional merchandise exports. In most other cases ―think of your 
foreign holiday or your hairdresser― it is difficult to separate production and consumption of 
the service in time and space. It implies that for an international transaction to take place, either 
the producer or the consumer himself must go abroad. The producer can set up a production 
unit abroad or can have himself represented by an employee sent abroad on a temporary basis. 
While exporting and production abroad are optional supply forms for manufacturing firms, in 
some service industries the only feasible way for a firm to supply a foreign market is by setting 
up a local subsidiary (Sampson and Snape, 1985). The GATS treaty therefore identifies four 
modes of international service supply, as shown in Table 2.1. The table shows that international 
service deliveries in most cases occur through subsidiaries.  
 
Table 2.1  Modes of international service supply in the GATS treaty, and dominant types of trade barriers 
GATS supply modes  Type of international service 
transactions 
Share in world   
service trade
a) 
  Type of regulation-based trade barriers 
affecting this supply mode 
       
Mode I  Service products cross the border    28 % 
 
  Quantitative restrictions, tariffs, 
discriminatory levies 
Mode II  Consumers cross the border 
(mainly tourism, health and 
education services) 
14 %    Discriminatory levies 
Mode III  Service firms establish a 
production unit abroad 
(commercial presence) 
57 %    Requirements for products and/or 
suppliers, network access restrictions, 
quantitative restrictions 
Mode IV  Temporary migration of natural 
persons to deliver services 
abroad (business travel, 
contractual service providers). 
1 %    Quantitative restrictions, visa 
procedures, discriminatory levies, 
requirements for products and suppliers  
  a)
 Supply mode shares for 2000 are taken from World Bank (2003). 
 
Many governments regulate domestic service markets and put up impediments to the presence, 
operation and movement of foreign service providers. The table indicates which type of 
regulation-based trade barriers one typically finds in relation to the four supply modes. Some 
supply modes are affected more intensely than others by regulation-based trade barriers. The 
toughest regulation-based barriers are typically found for Mode IV, followed by Modes III and 
I. Market access for Mode II is relatively free.  
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The 1995 GATS treaty was a historical achievement. For the first time WTO member countries 
laid down mutual obligations to lower market access barriers for foreign service providers, and 
to abstain from discrimination between domestic and foreign service providers. Figure 2.1 
characterises in a nutshell the baseline situation at the beginning of the Doha Round. It shows 
the structure of service sector commitments and the relative size of these sectors in world 
service trade. The structure of the commitments is pretty much in line with some predictions 
from trade theory.  
Burgess (1990) has shown that the international competitiveness of non-service industries 
can be improved by free trade in intermediate services, so that domestic non-service industries 
can use the best available intermediary inputs. Ethier (1982) argued that production inputs from 
different national origins can be complementary rather than competing. When domestic final 
goods firms appreciate greater variety in inputs, liberalisation of input trade is welfare-
increasing. Markusen (1989) developed a model for trade in knowledge-intensive intermediary 
services, in which the crucial assumptions are that these services are differentiated products, 
and that they are produced under increasing returns to scale.
3 Product differentiation means that 
foreign products often are complementary rather than competing. Due to the scale effect, the 
extent of differentiation is limited by the size of the market. Hence, by liberalising trade in 
knowledge-intensive services, countries essentially confer a positive technological externality 
on their trading partners. Markusen predicts considerable welfare gains by opening up national 
markets for such production services.  
If these authors ―writing well before the end of the Uruguay Round― were right, we 
would expect that trade lobbies from inside and outside the service industries must easily be 
able to convince their governments that trade in these producer services should be liberalised 
(cf. Mitra 1999). Apparently it worked, judging from Figure 2.1. Without implying any causal 
relationship, this figure shows that shows that liberalisation concessions were concentrated in 
service industries that also accounted for the largest share in service trade. 
 
 
3 The knowledge necessary for producing these services must be acquired at an initial learning cost, after which the services 
can be provided at relatively low marginal costs.  
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Figure 2.1  The structure of WTO bindings by service industry at the start of the Doha round: number of 
participating countries and share in service exports
4 
 
Most trade concessions were done for tourism. This can be seen as a special case to the extent 
that opening up borders for tourism hardly bears any costs in terms of competing domestic 
supply. Apart from tourism, producer services account for most of the country bindings during 
the Uruguay Round. The two ellipses in the graph demarcate the positions of producer services 
within the GATS commitments. Business and financial services are the service sectors that 
come closest to Markusen’s concept of knowledge-intensive producer services, and these 
services account for the highest number of mutual trade concessions. If the number of countries 
offering legally binding concessions is taken as a yardstick, we may conclude that WTO 
members tend to consider trade concessions for these industries a win-win strategy. Transport, 
although representing a large share in international service trade, is a somewhat mixed case. Of 
all producer services, it accounts for the lowest number of trade concessions. The number of 
countries with trade concessions is also rather low for the other service industries: construction, 
culture-related and government-related services. We argue later on that this may be due to the 
fact that trade liberalisation in these areas requires more complex domestic welfare trade-offs.  
 
At the outset of the new Doha Round, a host of studies estimated through scenario simulations 
the magnitude of potential welfare gains that could result from further liberalisation of services 
(OECD 2003). Table 2.2 summarises some important studies, the type of simulation model 
used, the liberalisation scenarios, and the welfare results.  
 
4 The structure of the G7 exports is sued as the best available approximation for the structure of world service trade. Source: 
Kox and Lejour (2004).  
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Table 2.2  Summary results of main international studies on the effects of a new GATS round 
Study  Model used  Magnitude service 
trade barriers 
Liberalisation scenario   Worldwide impact in % GDP 
(and /or bln. US $)  
 
Mode I : border-crossing services  
World Bank 
(2003) 
Linkage: dynamic AGE 
model, constant 
returns to scale  
Tariff equivalents 
10% 
Abandoning all tariffs.  
Cost reduction 10% in all 
services 
Non-OECD GDP + 9.4%  
(880 bln. US$). Impact 
service liberalisation 4x that 
of manufacturing  
         
Chadka et al. 
(2000); 
Brown et al. 
(2001) 




80% tariff equiv. 
33% reduction of barriers  400 bln. US$ 
OECD GDP +2% 
Non-OECD GDP +2,5%  
         
Robinson et 
al. (1999) 
Clone of GTAP model, 




a   
80% tariff equiv. 
50% reduction, with and 
without additional 
productivity growth 
World GDP  + 1–3 %; impact 
service liberalisation 5x that 
of manufacturing 
         
Francois et 
al. (2003) 
GTAP model with 
imperfect competition  
Tariff equivalents: 
OECD 5%; rest of 
the world 10% 
50% reduction   World GDP + 25–50 bln. US$  
 








(constant returns to 
scale), with FDI 
(commercial  
presence )  
about 10% (tariff 
equivalents) 
Full market access and 
non-discrimination in 3 
industries: telecom, 
financial and business 
services  
Non-OECD  GDP + 0.5%  
OECD GDP + 0.1 – 0.2%  
 




GMig = GTAP 
(constant returns to 








migration of schooled and 
unschooled labour up to 
3% of employment
b) 
World GDP +0.6% (152 bln 
$)  OECD GDP + $74 bln. 
non-OECD GDP + $78 bln.  
 
          a) Hoekman indices are tariff equivalents constructed on the basis of country offers for market access (or the lack of offers) during the 
Uruguay Round. Tariff equivalents are expressed as a percentage of imports value. 
b)
 Only simulation results for services are reported here. 
Sources: the studies mentioned and OECD (2003). 
 
Most studies use a static general equilibrium model, and solely focus on service supply through 
mode I, even though this supply mode represents a minority of international service 
transactions. The 'mode I' studies start from different views on the magnitude of trade barriers, 
varying between 5 and 80 per cent tariff equivalents.
5 Also their liberalisation scenarios differ. 
Nonetheless, they typically find welfare effects of several hundred billion US dollars. Because 
these studies do not take account to the dynamic effects of trade liberalisation, nor the other 
 
5 Only the FTAP studies are based on a systematic and detailed study of trade barriers for service industries (Findlay and 
Warren 2001); the other studies adopt a more rough estimating method like Hoekman indices. See Whalley (2003) and 
OECD (2003) for a review of recent analytical and empirical work on quantifying market access barriers in services.  
  15 
service modes of supply, the total welfare gains are probably much higher. The FTAP studies 
from the Australian Productivity Commission pay specific attention to supply mode III, while 
one study investigates the impact of less restrictive regulations with regards to mode IV 
(Walmsley and Winters, 2003). Taking a meta view, four conclusions emerge from the 
simulation results: 
 
·  Both developing and developed countries stand to gain in welfare.  
·  Relative to GDP, non-OECD countries stand to gain most by lowering barriers to service trade.
6  
·  Potential welfare results strongly depend on the assumed magnitude of trade barriers.  
·  The large differences between studies as to the size of market barriers marks the absence of a 
uniform yardstick for assessing whether and to what extent trade barriers hamper access to 
national service markets. 
 
6 The total welfare effect in developing countries suggested by some studies would dwarf the total amount of net official 
development aid originating from OECD countries ($58 billion in 2002).  
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3  GATS outcomes in the Doha Round 
Taken together, the scenario studies suggest that trade liberalisation in services is a potential 
win-win game for the world community. This begs the question whether this potential outcome 
will be 'cashed in' after the present GATS round. So far, country commitments for Mode III are 
more extensive than the commitments under Mode I (WTO 2001b). Hauser and Wunsch (2002) 
infer from this that the first GATS agreement emulates a foreign investment agreement rather 
than one allowing for cross-border trade. Taken at face value, this suggests that there is much 
scope for improving the existing GATS commitments for cross-border trade in services. What 
can we expect from the present round of GATS negotiations?  
 
The first indications are not too promising. According to the initial schedule, the Doha Round 
should be concluded before 2005. The start of the negotiations can hardly be called dazzling. 
There was a slow start in tabling initial negotiation offers and requests with regard to services, 
especially on account of developing countries. The failure of the WTO ministerial conference in 
Cancún (September 2003) indicated that the Doha Round might not be finalised before 2005. 
The imminent change of major negotiating dramatis personae in 2004 ―associated with US 
presidential elections and changes in the European Commission ― will not contribute much 
towards keeping the GATS negotiations out of the doldrums. We can keep in mind that the 
Uruguay Round took nearly eight years, almost twice the original schedule. 
 
A way to find out tentatively what results this round may yield, is to compare the offers that 
countries have put forward. Since the negotiations generally follow a path of reciprocity, we 
investigated the concordance between national offers in specific service industries. The idea is 
that service industries with a high density of national offers are more likely to see negotiation 
breakthroughs. Concordance between national offers at industry level can be regarded as a 
bottom-line condition for positive results. It does not rule out the possibility that some cross-
issue compromises are accomplished in the final phase of negotiations. For instance, service 
concessions by developing countries tend to hinge on a breakthrough in  agriculture 
negotiations. Save for last-minute concessions which countries tend to keep in their back 
pockets till the very last stage of negotiations, a concordance analysis yields an indication of 
probable GATS results during the Doha Round.  
By the end of 2003, about 40 countries had deposited offers for improving market access 
and alleviating discriminatory measures. Most of these offers are rather modest, and in many 
cases they hardly go beyond committing domestic liberalisation measures that had already 
become actual practice since the Uruguay Round. Such concessions will not result in additional 
international trade in services. For a more industry-level perspective, we base ourselves on 
initial market access offers, which the 9 major OECD countries (together representing three- 
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quarters of international service trade) by the end of 2003 had tabled for services. Table 3.1 
shows the industry level densities.  
 
Table 3.1  GATS market access offers by major OECD countries
a) at the end of 2003 
Industry  Number of countries     Industry  Number of countries 
         
Transport   9    Tourism  5 
Business services  8    Education  4 
Financial services   8    Energy  3 
Communication and postal 
services 
8   
Media, recreation, cultural 
services  
2 
Environmental services  7    Health services  0 
Construction  6    PM   
Distribution  5    Mode IV  5 
       
Note: a) The European Union is regarded as one country; the other countries are: USA, Japan, Canada, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, 
Norway and Switzerland. Source: compiled for published negotiations offers. 
 
Again we find most offers for trade concessions in the group of producer services. If reciprocity 
forms the basis for GATS results, we may expect positive liberalisation results for business 
services, communication and postal services, financial services, transport and environmental 
services. Environmental services still represents as small fraction of international services trade. 
Postal and courier services are relatively new at the GATS table. Completely new are energy-
related services. Even a GATS classification scheme for reciprocal concessions in this area is 
still lacking, so that few results on energy can be anticipated in this round. All major countries 
except the USA have tabled offers for the maritime transport sector. A breakthrough crucially 
depends on the USA. During the Uruguay Round, the USA effectively blocked the 
accomplishment of a maritime agreement, and its market access offers are meagre once again. 
The prospects for results in other service sectors (education, health, media and culture) are 
bleak, if only because countries prefer to keep these issues in the public rather than the private 
domain. Mode IV is the area in which developing countries hope to achieve successes, 
especially for services that require much unskilled labour. While the admitted duration of stay 
for higher educated natural persons that deliver services abroad might be extended, the 2003 
offers do not justify optimism that such concessions will also be reached for less educated 
service providers.  
 
Summing up, the negotiation offers by major OECD countries at best offer the prospect of 
modest and fragmented negotiation result; the Doha Round will not have grand results for 
services. It will take future GATS negotiation rounds to accomplish most the welfare gains that 
are predicted by most of the liberalisation studies mentioned in Table 2.2. It is our opinion that 
real future negotiation progress requires a different approach.   
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4  Intrinsic difficulties in services trade negotiations 
Service products and the relevant trade barriers in services tend to be more heterogeneous than 
in agriculture or manufacturing. Non-tariff measures rather than tariffs form the most important 
type of market barrier for services. Those tariffs hamper market access for foreign trade, and to 
what extent, can be assessed in a relatively straightforward way. On that basis, countries may 
negotiate mutual concession packages of more or less similar magnitude. This procedure is unfit 
for services. Often it cannot be assessed unequivocally whether ―and to what extent―  a 
domestic measure hampers market access for foreign service suppliers, and therefore, whether it 
is an effective non-tariff barrier (NTB). Many domestic regulations and measures with a NTB 
character were not introduced for protectionist purposes. Rather, they address purely domestic 
issues, mostly for correcting some forms of market failure.
7 The trade impact of the measure is 
a side-effect that was unintended, or thought of as unimportant.   
 
Table 4.1  Motivation of domestic measures with a NTB character 
Type of NTB




       
Trade-related quantitative 
restrictions  
Import ban, import quotas, export ban  yes  No 
       
Price-based NTBs   Differentiated tariffs or levies for domestic and 
foreign service providers  
yes  No 
       
Quantitative restrictions 
unrelated to trade  
Limitation market access through licenses, visa, 
domain monopolies, environmental or spatial 
restrictions  
Often: not   Often implicit 
discrimination  
       
Requirements for service 
product  
Compulsory norms and standards for product   Often: not  Often implicit 
discrimination 
       
Requirements for service 
providers  
Qualification, obligatory membership of national 
professional organisations, operational 
requirements, juridical status 
Often: not  Often implicit 
discrimination 
       
Differentiated access to 
national distribution systems  
Rules for fixed infrastructure (rail, water, energy, 
telecommunication networks) 
Often: not  Often implicit 
discrimination 
       
Note: a) we follow the classification that Hoekman and Braga (1997) introduced for NTBs in service markets. 
 
 
7 The existence of market failures implies that the free operation of a service market either results in too low or too high 
consumption of a certain service, compared to a welfare optimum. The market failures being mostly at stake in service 
markets are: structural uncertainty on the quality of the service (asymmetric information), positive or negative externalities 
conferred to the rest of the economy by production or consumption of the service, and the existence of setup costs in 
production (scale minimum).  
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Table 4.1 reviews the main types of NTBs in services, their trade-related intentions and their 
infringement on the 'national treatment' principle of WTO. Only for two types of NTBs, we can 
say unambiguously that the measure is a form of outright protectionism, and that it 
discriminates openly towards foreign providers of services. In all other cases, this is much more 
difficult to assess. Discrimination of foreign suppliers is often implicit, meaning that these 
suppliers need to do more effort and incur larger costs in order to comply with the requirements 
of a domestic regulation.  
 
Once we accept that many NTBs were designed for repairing domestic market failures, this 
cannot but affect the way we deal with liberalisation in service trade. Let us follow the decision 
track that eventually leads to country Y's GATS commitment to drop or alleviate a certain 
measure:   
 
1.  Domestic lobby parties in country Y seldom indicate or complain that a domestic measure 
functions as a NTB. The exceptions are situations where an organised group of domestic firms 
clearly feel themselves put at a competitive advantage by not having access to cheap or more 
varied foreign imports.
8 The general case is, however, that domestic action with regard to NTBs 
is lacking. Following Olson (1965), it can be explained from the structure of protection costs. 
International trade is unimportant in most service industries, so that the opportunity costs –i.e. 
the potential benefits of liberalisation– are also invisible. Moreover, the costs of protection are 
spread thinly over anonymous sections of the domestic economy. NTBs often resulted from 
government dialogue with domestic professional associations and incumbent firms, the same 
who gain most from the NTB protection. 
2.  Consequently, foreign action is normally required for even signalling the existence of NTB 
protection. Foreign firms in country X feeling that a government measure in country Y puts 
them artificially at a competitive disadvantage, complain to their own government. If this fits 
into the latter's policy priorities, country X will put up the issue as a GATS negotiation demand 
to country Y. The burden of proof rests with country X, and it may not be easy to substantiate 
claims that export or investment opportunities are negatively affected. 
3.  Nonetheless, the GATS demand raises domestic awareness in country Y. Its government now 
has to reconsider the domestic costs and benefits associated with the NTB, and evaluate its 
alternatives. Are the market failures that initially led to the NTB measure still valid? Can the 
measure be alleviated or substituted by less trade-restricting measures? What are the possible 
welfare gains from reciprocal GATS concessions that may be asked from country X in exchange 
for dropping the NTB? What magnitude has the overall domestic liberalisation benefits? 
 
8 The endogenous liberalisation lobby always has been strongest for producer services, which may explain why this part of 
service trade was liberalised already during the Uruguay Round. Domestic lobbies are also important in the case of acute 
labour market scarcities (e.g. ICT personnel).  
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The complexities and slowness of this decision process may explain why the GATS 
negotiations so far have achieved only modest successes in removing market access barriers in 
services. The 1995 GATS agreement (article VI:4) has created an opening for dealing with 
domestic regulations that have a negative impact on trade. According to this article, the WTO 
Council on Trade in Services (or its subsidiary bodies) should develop "disciplines" aimed at 
ensuring that qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing 
requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services. So far, the WTO did 
not yet develop effective checks on, and necessity tests for national regulatory measures.
9 The 
proposal that we describe in the next section offers a method for its design and elaboration. If 
adopted, the proposal could make actual negotiations much more effective, by cutting-short the 
three aforementioned decision steps.  
 
9 The WTO Council for Trade in Services, nonetheless, has done some work to promote that national accountancy 
standards are based on internationally agreed standards. The GATS Working Party on Professional Services recognises 
that  ─with respect to accountancy─ member governments may have legitimate regulatory objectives in the areas of "inter 
alia the protection of consumers (...), the quality of the service, professional competence and the integrity of the profession".  
Cf. WTO Council for Trade in Services (1999b).  
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5  A possible way forward 
The basic idea is that countries review and classify the NTB character of measures that deal 
with market failures in their domestic service industries. The classification procedure itself is 
based upon guidelines from the WTO or another independent institute or commission.  Some 
lessons can be learned from the way in which agricultural subsidies were brought into the WTO 
negotiation framework during the Uruguay Round.  
 
Just like service-industry NTBs, agricultural subsidies are a multi-headed monster. It was felt 
that cutting off one "subsidy head" in the negotiations might just stimulate the growth of 
subsidies under a new heading.
10 WTO leadership therefore opted for an integral approach. The 
WTO agriculture negotiations got a strong push once member countries agreed to classify their 
own agricultural support measures in three virtual "coloured boxes". The amber box contained 
the most trade-distorting measures like guaranteed prices, export subsidies and import tariffs. 
The blue box held the somewhat less distorting measures like income support for farmers. 
Finally, the green box contained the measures with the smallest impact on agricultural trade like 
government support for agricultural education or agricultural research. Once governments 
themselves had classified their own support measures, the latter became more comparable. The 
operation resulted in a massive volume of technical and general information on agricultural 
protection, support and distortion and its consequences. This increase in information has made 
even opaque policy instruments more transparent. As a consequence, it became easier to 
structure the agricultural talks and achieve successes at that negotiation table. 
 
A similar approach can be used to strike a better balance between liberalised service trade and 
the correction of domestic market failures. The trade-distorting effects and the welfare aims at 
which the non-tariff measures originally aimed, need to be disentangled. Table 5.1 offers a 
classification of NTBs in four virtual boxes, based on four criteria. The table also specifies the 
main direction of the negotiation solutions.  
 
The red box contains NTBs like quantitative trade restrictions or price differentiation for 
domestic and foreign providers of services. These measures are obviously at odds with the 
WTO principle of non-discrimination. The NTBs in the red box do not address domestic market 
failures and protectionist motives prevail. Such NTBs deserve priority in the negotiations. 
 
 
10Cf. Harvey (1994); Rayner et al. (1993).  
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Table 5.1  Classification of non-tariff barriers in services for future GATS negotiations 















           
Red box  Yes  Yes  No  Not applicable  Negotiate in GATS 
           
Brown box  No  No  Yes  No  Discuss in GATS: establish principle of 
least trade-distorting measure, introduce 
limitation in time  
           
Blue box  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Establish in GATS that these NTBs have 
to conform with internationally 
harmonised standards or mutually 
recognized 
           
Green box  No  Yes  Yes  No  Keep them outside GATS framework 
when positive domestic welfare effects 
dominate 
 
Measures that do address domestic market failures, but have unintended and/or unnecessary 
trade-restricting impacts, belong in the brown box. In these cases, adaptation of the measures 
may be relatively easy and costless, if GATS creates an incentive for doing so. When 
considering positive domestic welfare effects of more foreign market access, the brown-box 
cases are potential win-win situations. The reciprocity incentive may suffice to tackle these 
cases in the GATS negotiations. 
  The blue box contains more complicated NTBs in services industries. These measures 
address real market failures, but do so at a national basis, while the market failure has broadly 
shared international dimensions. An example is the use of national accountancy standards and 
associated professional qualification. Having to re-qualify in each national market implies a 
market access barrier for internationally operating providers of accountancy services. National 
accountancy standards make it difficult or at least costly for firms to operate in foreign markets. 
This market barrier is a side-effect of intervention for an internationally shared problem.
11 
GATS negotiations are not the proper negotiating forum to discuss the harmonisation of 
standards; there are better international forums for doing so. The same applies, mutatis 
mutandis, for standards in the areas of telecommunication, postal services or shipping 
standards. GATS negotiations do, however, offer the possibility for countries to lay down the 
commitment that their national standards for these services will be based on internationally 
agreed standards. Alternatively, they may agree on mutual recognition of national qualification 
standards and professional requirements in specified service industries. 
 
11 The trustworthiness, accuracy and reliability of accountancy reports are essential for the functioning of financial systems; 
hence, it is a source of positive externalities. The market failure is that such externalities tend to be in short supply due to 
free-riding behaviour.  
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Finally, the green box includes those measures that repair domestic market failures, with 
unavoidable trade effects that a country wants to take for granted, because of strong national 
preferences. The green box in fact circumscribes the no-go area for GATS negotiations. 
Examples of green box measures are likely to be found in the areas of environmental and social 
policy, culture-related services, education, health, safety and security issues. Also the 
demarcation between public and private services could be brought into the green box.
12 An 
option would be to limit the applicability of the green box to domestic regulations in specific 
areas, like protection of non-business consumers and national security. For regulatory measures 
in the green box, GATS could require that the measures are transparent, and that they are 
notified to a public register administered by the GATS Secretariat. 
 
This new negotiation approach requires preparatory work from the WTO/GATS secretariat. It 
should not be too difficult for them to prepare –as an example– a longlist of typical non-tariff 
measures that countries might consider per service industry and per supply mode. A new 
version of the GATS Negotiating Guidelines (WTO 2001a) would be required, with global 
consistency guidelines for classification of domestic NTBs by the member countries.
13  
   
 
12 For government services like education and health the low level of mutual trade concessions in the Doha Round can be 
explained by the fact that most WTO members still prefer to keep these activities in the public services domain, and hence 
outside the GATS negotiations. 
13 Mattoo and Wunsch (2004, p. 28) propose a "prudential carve-out" clause for domestic regulation that can be useful for 
defining the green box domain, although the authors use the proposal in a different context.  
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Figure 5.1  Classification framework for non-tariff barriers in service industries 
Do regulation measures 
for this service industry 
address domestic market 
failures?  
Do the measures 
discriminate against  
foreign service providers?  
No action 
      No 
      No 
 Yes 
Are market failures for this 
industry common to a 
number of countries?
Can national regulation measures in 
principle be based on international 
standards and/ or international 
regulatory co-operation?
 Yes  Red box 
 Yes   Yes  Blue box 
Have national regulation measures been screened 
with "Least trade-restrictiveness" criterion? *)
   No 
      No  Brown box 
 Yes 
Does resulting regulation increase the costs of 
market access for foreign service providers?       No  No action 
Is trade effect evaluated on basis of domestic  
welfare trade-off?
 Yes 
 Yes  Green box 
*) Sub-criteria: transparency, objectiveness, not more burdensome than necessary to ensure quality, national treatment
 No
   No 
 
 
Figure 5.1 offers the skeleton for a decision framework that may be translated into the 
preparatory guidelines for member countries. If such a scheme is to be applied in future 
negotiations, member countries should agree on procedural rules for the preparation of future 
negotiation rounds by the WTO/GATS Secretariat.   
Prior to the start of the negotiations, countries submit their self-review report on the trade 
barriers to the GATS secretariat. They have to authorise the review on basis of a formal 
consistency check whether it has been prepared according to the negotiation guidelines. This 
process may prevent too bold dissimilarities in the way member states classify their NTBs. An 
arbitrage committee of the impartial trade specialists may handle conflicts between countries 
and the GATS secretariat on the authorisation procedure. 
  
  27 
6  Conclusions 
Future GATS rounds are likely to increase in complexity. The reason is that at some moment 
the 'easy' liberalisation measures - like removing domestic regulations that unintended hamper 
international market access - will be exhausted. The remaining non-tariff measures that restrict 
access to national service markets will increasingly be associated with competing national 
policy goals like for instance consumer protection. Removing or changing such non-tariff 
measures will evoke more complex domestic welfare trade-offs, and international co-ordination 
will get more difficult. In view of the upcoming negotiation issues, our study proposes an 
analytical framework that could keep future GATS rounds manageable. Non-tariff barriers are 
classified into four categories, based on the degree of trade distortion, the desired degree of 
international coordination and the domestic motivation for regulation that resulted into the trade 
barrier. 
Application of this approach might bring more focus in future GATS negotiations, by 
concentrating solely on the biggest distortions and the really negotiable cases. The current  
practice is that country X's demands to country Y are based on a broad-spectre approach, 
including issues that in country Y are covered by strong national preferences, and therefore 
non-negotiable (green box). Trade talks on such issues are frustrating and at best unproductive. 
Our proposal may strengthen the speed and efficiency of future GATS rounds along three lines.  
In our approach, negotiations would go straight to the red-box and brown-box issues where 
the biggest and quickest results may be expected. This classification will most probably raise 
the efficiency and speed of the ensuing negotiations, because the trade talks can become much 
more focussed. Also the blue-box issues offer prospects for finding common grounds, although 
a different negotiation approach is required here. The structure of the 1995 GATS agreement 
offers a useful basis for starting the blue-box negotiations.
14 
Our proposal will possibly also raise the efficiency of GATS negotiations in another way, by 
cutting away part of the incentive for free riding behaviour that is now associated with WTO's 
most-favoured nation (MFN) principle. The present system operates on the basis of country 
offers and demands. Basically countries do trade concessions to other countries in order to 
receive a trade concession in exchange. The game is to "give away" as little as possible initially, 
to acquire as much as possible in exchange. Individual countries negotiate country by country, 
sector by sector with other GATS members: a wearying process. The MFN principle guarantees 
that a far-reaching concession done to one negotiation partner should also be available to other 
GATS partners. The mechanism creates an incentive for some players to "do" as little as 
possible early in the negotiations. Such 'wait and see' behaviour protracts the negotiation 
 
14 In particular, articles VI:4 and VI:5 of the GATS. Furthermore, WTO Council for Trade in Services (1999a) summarises the 
international regulatory initiatives in services, which can be used in the context of blue-box negotiations.  
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process. Our proposal will not completely get rid of such free riding, but the classification 
process forces member countries from early on to visualise the red-box and brown-box issues 
that are to become the object of mutual trade concessions. This in itself will probably speed up 
the negotiating process.  
Finally the review process will raise the awareness of trade-distortive effects of national 
regulation. This could have a self-disciplinary impact even before negotiations start such that 
countries eradicate NTBs that belong in the brown box (unintended and unnecessary side 
effects). 
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